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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The notion of a conscious machine is by no means a new one. 
Science-fiction stories of computers and robots gaining consciousness 
infiltrate nearly every medium of today’s pop culture. But these stories are 
just that: stories. And while the glorified narratives that we see and hear 
about of computers falling in love or anthropomorphic robots taking over 
the world are certainly exaggerated, the basic notion behind them is not. 
Significant progress has undoubtedly been made recently in the field of 
artificial intelligence. This progress has been so significant even that the 
idea that a truly conscious machine may exist (perhaps even someday 
soon) is not far-fetched or unheard of. But is this actually possible? What 
would machine consciousness look like? 
This thesis seeks to answer the following question: “could a 
machine be capable of consciousness?” I begin to tackle this question by 
providing a presumed definition of consciousness, employing Bernard 
Baars’ Global Workspace Theory. Next, I look to various discussions of 
machine intelligence and whether or not this would be sufficient for 
categorizing a machine as conscious. And lastly, I explore the notion that 
the human brain may be a sort of computational system itself and the 
implications this notion has for the potential that non-human systems may 
achieve consciousness. 
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Through these sections, I ultimately conclude that a machine could 
potentially mimic the cognitive systems of the human brain that produce 
consciousness (at least insofar as these systems and consciousness itself 
are defined by Global Workspace Theory). And therefore, a machine 
could indeed be capable of consciousness. 
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SECTION 1: 
PRESUMING A DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
In order to determine at what point a machine might become conscious, I 
must first provide a presumed definition of consciousness to which I will refer 
throughout this thesis. For the purpose of this argument, I will employ Bernard 
Baars’ Global Workspace Theory, which he details in his 1988 book entitled A 
Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. While a complete examination of this book 
and its explanation of Global Workspace Theory is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, I will provide a broad overview which is necessary to my argument. First, I 
will outline the models Baars develops and the general path he takes in A 
Cognitive Theory of Consciousness to explain how this definition of 
consciousness actually functions (Baars, 1988). 
Baars initially discovers a way in which to state empirical constraints which 
any adequate theory of consciousness would meet: using multiple contrasting 
pairs of similar events in which one event, given any adequate theory of 
consciousness, would be considered conscious while the other event would not be 
(i.e. a conscious image of one’s morning breakfast in contrast with the same 
image of the same breakfast but in one’s memory and unconscious) (Baars, 1988, 
1.2.2). 
From this, Baars asserts that there is a system architecture, called the “global 
workspace,” in which internally consistent conscious representations are “globally 
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broadcast” to an assortment of specialized unconscious processors (Baars, 1988, 
Model 1). 
He then provides the neural basis for conscious experience by consulting 
neurophysiological evidence (via the Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating 
System), determining it to be largely consistent with the aforementioned 
framework (with the exception of the fact that there is evidence not solely for 
global broadcasting, but moreover, there is evidence for feedback from the 
receivers of the global messages and also in return to the source of the message) 
(Baars, 1988, Chapter 3). 
He then notes that some unconscious networks, referred to as “contexts,” 
shape conscious contents. Contexts can work collaboratively to cooperatively 
constrain conscious events. It is at this point that Baars determines that both 
global broadcasting and internal consistency are necessary conditions for 
conscious experience (Baars, 1988, Model 2). 
Then, to explain why repeated events tend to fade out of consciousness while 
still being processed unconsciously, Baars introduces another necessary condition 
for consciousness: informativeness. He defines informativeness as “a choice 
within a context of alternatives, demanding adaptation by other processors;” 
therefore, this necessary condition generates an operative function for the 
feedback coming from the receiving processors to the global workspace. He 
asserts that conscious experience requires some level of adaptation and that 
conscious events must be new or noteworthy in order to trigger adaptive 
processing (Baars, 1988, Model 3). 
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Next, he moves onto the concept of intentions, which are mostly unconscious 
goal structures that utilize conscious goal images to employ subgoals to achieve 
their goals. Notably, it is at this point that he suggests the idea of the stream of 
consciousness: intermingling conscious events and goal contexts (Baars, 1988, 
Model 4). 
From here, Baars turns to William James’ ideomotor theory of voluntary 
control to give an interpretation which proposes that, in the absence of any 
conflicting goal images or intentions, conscious goal images alone are able to 
prompt actions. Therefore, it follows that the conscious aspect of voluntary action 
is covertly shaped by several unconscious conditions. Here, Baars is finally 
capable of making sense of the association between actual qualitative conscious 
events (i.e. perception and imagery) and the existence of nonqualitative conscious 
contents (i.e. concepts and instantaneous intentions to act). After positing that 
there are momentary conscious images at work in abstract concepts and intentions 
(although these images are tough to recover), he concludes that “all conscious 
events involve qualitative phenomena, even though some may be quite difficult to 
retrieve” (Baars, 1988, Model 5). 
Baars then offers that there is a difference between “conscious experience as a 
subjectively passive state” and “attention as the active control of access to 
consciousness.” The distinction between these two seamlessly fits into Global 
Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, Model 6). 
He then shifts to deciphering the ideas of the “self” and the “self-concept.” 
Using the same minimal contrasts method, he offers a better understanding of the 
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notion of the “self.” He suggests that the “self” can be defined as the thing 
undergoing the context of experience and which “serves to organize and stabilize 
experiences across many different local contexts,” while the “self-concept” can be 
defined as “a control system that makes use of consciousness to monitor, evaluate, 
and control the self-system” (Baars, 1988, Model 7). 
Lastly, given all of these developments, Baars concludes that conscious 
experience plays several important roles in the nervous system. He lists 18 basic 
adaptive functions of consciousness (see Baars, 1988, Chapter 10), the most 
essential of which is consciousness’ capability of aiding in cooperative interaction 
between several sources of knowledge in order to deal with newness (Baars, 1988, 
Chapter 10). 
Finally, via the progression of these models, Baars arrives at 5 necessary 
conditions for conscious experience which will be vital to the definition of 
consciousness to which I will be referring in this thesis. They are as follows 
(Baars, 1988): 
1. “Conscious events involve globally broadcast information” 
2. “Conscious events are internally consistent” 
3. “Conscious events are informative- that is, they place a demand for 
adaptation on other parts of the system” 
4. “Conscious events require access by a self-system” 
5. “Conscious experience may require perceptual or imaginal events lasting 
for some minimum duration” 
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Before concluding this outline, I would like to address 2 replies to Baars’ 
Global Workspace Theory which merit acknowledgement in order to determine 
whether or not this is a fully sufficient definition of consciousness for the purpose 
of this thesis.  
The first of these replies comes from Ned Block’s “On a Confusion About a 
Function of Consciousness.” Block asserts that consciousness is a “mongrel” 
(hybrid) concept and that the word consciousness itself “connotes a number of 
different concepts and denotes a number of different phenomena” (Block, 1995). 
In other words, Block is suggesting that there is more than one thing to which 
“consciousness” refers.  
Block argues that Global Workspace Theory incorrectly conflates phenomenal 
consciousness with access consciousness (two uniquely different types of 
consciousness), suggesting that Baars continuously asserts that he is discussing 
phenomenal consciousness despite the Global Workspace Theory actually being a 
model of access consciousness (Block, 1995).  
If we accept this argument and the classification of consciousness as a 
“mongrel” concept, then Global Workspace Theory is indeed not a viable 
functioning definition of consciousness for this thesis because it would be unclear 
if the sort of consciousness present in humans is indeed the same sort of 
consciousness that could possibly be present in machines. 
However, I will instead accept a direct reply to Block from Baars himself in a 
paper entitled “Evidence that Phenomenal Consciousness is the Same as Access 
Consciousness,” so that we can dismiss Block’s reply and continue to employ 
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Global Workspace Theory as the functioning definition of consciousness for this 
thesis.  
In this rebuttal, Baars disputes Block’s assertion that consciousness is a 
“mongrel” concept in favor of the notion that consciousness is instead “a single 
core fact with many facets” (Baars, 1995). He also points out that this distinction 
is, in fact, an empirical one for which Block gives no evidence. And so, citing his 
own initial research, he reasserts that consciousness is indeed a “unified problem 
with many superficially different aspects,” and thus we may actually equate 
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. (Baars, 1995, 1988). 
Therefore, Global Workspace Theory remains a sustainable definition of 
consciousness for the purpose of this thesis. 
Another reply to Global Workspace Theory which ought to be acknowledged 
in order to deem this definition of consciousness viable is Susan Blackmore’s 
challenge of the concept of stream of consciousness in her paper entitled “There is 
No Stream of Consciousness.”  
In this paper, Blackmore claims that consciousness is a “grand illusion” 
(Blackmore, 2002). This assertion merits recognition in this thesis because if we 
accept that consciousness is merely an illusion and that these spaces which Baars 
refers to do not exist, then any sort of consciousness a machine may possess 
might also be illusory. In this case, we would have no way of knowing if a 
machine had actually reached consciousness or if the machine was merely 
purporting itself to be conscious, and this thesis does not ask the question: “can a 
machine possess the illusion of consciousness?” 
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However, Blackwell’s claim and Global Workspace Theory do not seem to be 
mutually exclusive. While the notion of the stream of consciousness which 
Blackwell points to certainly could be illusory, this illusion may in fact simply be 
a byproduct of the processes at work in Global Workspace Theory. Therefore, 
whether or not stream of consciousness is an illusion is irrelevant to concluding if 
a being and/or machine is conscious. And thus, we can maintain that Global 
Workspace Theory is indeed a feasible presumed definition of consciousness for 
my arguments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cornwell 11 
 
SECTION 2: 
MACHINE INTELLEGENCE 
 
Given the presumed definition of consciousness (Global Workspace 
Theory) which I outlined in the previous section, I will now move onto examining 
the role intelligence plays in determining whether or not a machine can be said to 
have reached consciousness. 
The Turing test, proposed by Alan Turing in “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence”, assesses machine intelligence (Turing, 1950). Using the test, we can 
attempt to decide whether or not a machine’s behavior is indistinguishable from a 
human’s behavior. The machine is assessed by a human evaluator who holds 
conversations with many participants through conversational text on a computer. 
All of these participants are humans except the machine which is being evaluated. 
The machine will have passed the Turing test if the human evaluating the machine 
ultimately cannot distinguish between the human participants and the machine 
participant. Turing concludes that if a machine can pass the test, it is then capable 
of intelligence (Turing, 1950). 
While this process is now commonly referred to as simply the Turing test, 
Alan Turing initially called it “the imitation game” (Turing, 1950). The imitation 
game works as follows: a neutral human interrogator resides in a room separate 
from two other human participants, one of which is a female and one of which is a 
male (A and B, respectively). The interrogator labels the two beings X and Y. The 
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interrogator then asks a series of questions in an attempt to decipher which 
participant is X and which participant is Y. In order to mask the participants’ 
voices, all answers are given through a typed medium. Both participants, 
however, are meant to attempt to convince the interrogator that they are the 
female participant.  
Turing then expands this thought experiment of the imitation game to 
machine intelligence by replacing participant A with a computer (Turing, 1950). 
Turing begins with the imitation game and eventually replaces one of the 
participants with a machine to show that only beings that are capable of 
intelligence (such as humans) are capable of passing the test. And thus, if a 
machine could act in the way that these humans could, we would consider it to be 
intelligent as well (Turing, 1950).  
Robert French, though, argues that the Turing test is not a viable 
measurement of intelligence, since it tests only for intelligence which would be 
present in humans (French, 1990). He concludes that “the [Turing] test provides a 
guarantee not of intelligence but of culturally-oriented human intelligence” 
(French, 1990, 54). To combat this, he constructs what he calls the seagull test, 
which he then compares to the Turing test.  
The seagull test is a theoretical test for flight. The test goes that a machine 
can be considered capable of flight if a neutral onlooker cannot distinguish 
between the machine and a real seagull when looking at a three-dimensional radar 
screen (French, 1990). Of course, any machine which passes the seagull test 
would indeed be capable of flight, but there are undoubtedly a number of flight-
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capable things which would not pass the test since the test’s expectations of flight 
capability are much too high and much too specific (French, 1990). For example, 
an airplane would not be indistinguishable from a seagull on a three-dimensional 
radar screen, but an airplane seems capable of some sort of flight.  
French concludes then, that since the capacity for flight should not be 
equated to a seagull’s version of what flight is, intelligence should not be equated 
to a human’s version of what intelligence is. This, he argues, is how the Turing 
test fails (French, 1990). 
We must, therefore, consider the notion that being human may not 
necessary for the sort of intelligence posited by the Turing test and that this 
“culturally-oriented human intelligence” may not be the only sort of intelligence 
to exist (French, 1990, 54).  
Human brains function much in the same way that machines do: we 
receive an input which is processed through our biological “program” via our 
brains “electrical wires,” and then we give an output. We perceive this process as 
intelligence, and, as humans, we would quite likely pass the Turing test (unless, of 
course, we were intentionally trying to fail and deceive the interrogator) given the 
fact that the test itself assesses whether or not a computer is indistinguishable 
from a human.  
If we take this view to be true and concede that our brains are also just 
computers following a program, yet we still consider ourselves to have thought 
and understanding in addition to intelligence, then I conclude that a machine 
which is capable of passing the Turing test could potentially have the capacity for 
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thought and understanding in addition to being capable of intelligence and 
furthermore that being biologically human is not necessary for thought and 
understanding. 
Alan Turing himself addresses several criticisms of his argument. 
Importantly, though, is the objection which he calls the argument from 
consciousness (Turing, 1950, 446). The argument from consciousness says that 
the Turing test is not a viable test of machine intelligence because it does not test 
for consciousness and only conscious beings are capable of intelligence. This 
objection is simply a “denial of the validity of [the] test,” Turing says, and takes 
on a solipsist mindset which claims that “the only way by which one could be 
sure that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking” 
(Turing, 1950, 446, emphasis in original).  
Turing combats this suggestion by simply claiming that anyone who 
agrees with the argument from consciousness could eventually be convinced to 
abandon their claims, although he gives no further explanation for this (Turing, 
1950, 446). This seems to be a weak and insufficient response, as it is dismissive 
and does not give any further explanation as to why these people could be 
convinced otherwise.  
Furthermore, Turing acknowledges that “[he] do[es] not wish to give the 
impression that [he] think[s] there is no mystery about consciousness;” however, 
he also emphasizes that he “do[es] not think these mysteries necessarily need to 
be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this 
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paper” (Turing, 1950, 447). He therefore does not believe that consciousness is 
required for intelligence.  
Turing indeed understands that his test is insufficient for determining 
machine consciousness, he just does not feel a need to address the notion of 
machine consciousness at all (Turing, 1950). His interests, at least in this paper, 
lie in machine thinking and machine intelligence, not in machine consciousness, 
as made clear by his assertion that he does not need to address the problem of 
machine consciousness (Turing, 1950).  
Turing’s implication, then, is that there could in fact be intelligent 
machines which are not also conscious machines. This implication is essential to 
my assertion that intelligence is a necessary condition for determining if a 
machine is conscious. I maintain that even if a machine could truly possess the 
ability to think and ultimately to be categorized as intelligent, this is not a 
sufficient condition for considering the machine to be conscious. It is, however, a 
necessary one. A system, no matter what its biological makeup is, must be 
thinking, at least to some extent, to be conscious, given the fact that any sort of 
process at work in Global Workspace Theory is a thinking one (in the sense that 
they process information and function as a part of a system). 
Another critic of the Turing test, John Searle, objects to the notion of 
strong AI (which suggests that machines may actually be intelligent and capable 
of actual thought and understanding as we conceive of it) in his 1987 paper 
entitled “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” In this paper, Searle argues for the view 
of weak AI, which proposes that machines can merely simulate intelligence 
 Cornwell 16 
(Searle, 1987). He claims that no matter how advanced an AI becomes, it will 
never and indeed can never truly understand its outputs. The machine may appear 
human, but Searle holds that no matter how much a machine’s behavior mimics 
human behavior, it will never actually possess authentic intelligence and/or 
understanding. He argues for this view by proposing the Chinese Room thought 
experiment (Searle, 1987).  
In this thought experiment, Searle theorizes that he is in a room with 
ample writing materials as well as an English rule book for translating Chinese 
characters. Searle is given a task: he is fed inputs of Chinese characters, he 
utilizes the English rule book, and then he writes an output which is also in 
Chinese characters. Searle claims that he too, in this room, would pass the Turing 
test, despite never fully understanding Chinese since he is merely using a rule 
book which is written in his native English to decipher his Chinese inputs and 
construct his Chinese outputs (Searle, 1987).  
Ultimately, Searle asserts that, like himself, the machine would not have a 
genuine understanding of Chinese. However, many proponents of strong AI have 
replied to Searle’s Chinese room experiment, exposing its flaws. 
Perhaps the most convincing reply to Searle’s Chinese room experiment is 
what is known as the robot reply. The robot reply proposes that we can imagine a 
robot with a computer for its brain which would not only receive symbols as 
inputs and construct them as outputs, but which would also be able to perform 
human-like motor functions (i.e. it would have wheels for getting around, a 
camera for seeing, arms for moving objects, etc.). Therefore, this robot could 
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perform bodily actions via its computer brain much in the same way a human 
does. This robot, then would be able to learn through its physical being, as it 
would be able to utilize its sight and its physical actions to acquire knowledge and 
improve its computer brain, just as humans do as they grow up and learn more 
about the world around them (Searle, 1987, 420). 
However, vital to Searle’s refutation of the robot reply is the notion that 
the Chinese symbols do not actually have any real meaning. And since they do 
not have real meaning, they cannot yield real understanding. Therefore, the robot 
in the Chinese room could not, in fact, understand. Searle further refutes the robot 
reply by supposing that instead of putting a computer in the robot, he would make 
himself what he calls the robot’s homunculus. Searle still does not understand 
Chinese, but he can perform the task just as well as the robot’s computer brain by 
following his rule book. All Searle truly understands, he argues, is symbol 
manipulation (Searle 1987, 420).  
Searle goes on to claim that “the robot has no intentional states at all; it is 
simply moving about as a result of its electrical wiring and its program” (Searle, 
1987, 420). Moreover, when Searle is functioning as the robot’s homunculus, he 
insists that he too has no relevant intentional states since he is merely following 
the instructions he has been given.  
He insists that instantiating the same program is not a sufficient condition 
for having propositional attitudes such as humans have since this instantiation is 
merely the robot following its program (Searle, 1987, 420). Therefore, Searle 
argues, neither the computer brain nor Searle himself, when he is functioning as 
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the robot’s homunculus, actually understands Chinese since they are both mere 
instantiations of a program and are simply following what they are have been 
instructed to do. Ultimately, Searle concludes that both systems (the robot and 
Searle himself) have no intentionality (Searle, 1987, 420). 
However, in “Searle on What Only Brains Can Do,” Jerry Fodor suggests 
that Searle’s refutation of the robot reply remains unsatisfactory. Fodor argues 
that robots, in fact, do not merely instantiate programs, as Searle has claimed, 
since they are able to physically interact with their surroundings and even gain 
further knowledge in order to perform better by learning from these interactions 
through their experiences, much in the same manner that humans learn about the 
world as they grow up (Fodor, 1980). He notes that Searle fails to provide us with 
any sort of reason for believing that “biochemistry is important for intentionality 
and, prima facie, the idea that what counts is how the organism is connected to the 
world seems far more plausible” (Fodor, 1980, 431).  
Fodor argues for a causal theory: that if a system (which indeed is not 
necessarily a human system, for it could be a machine system, an animal system, 
etc.) possesses both a program for manipulating symbols and a way of interacting 
with the world, then those symbols surely have meaning because they provide a 
function and a purpose (this is opposed to Searle’s objection to the robot reply in 
which the Chinese symbols actually have no meaning) (Fodor, 1980). And if 
symbols have meaning, it follows that they have representational contents, 
meaning they represent an internal brain-state to the external world. Therefore, 
they have intentionality, since they possess both of these properties. In the case of 
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Searle’s refutation of the robot reply, both the computer brain and Searle himself 
functioning as the robot’s homunculus, then, have intentionality (Fodor, 1980, 
431). 
Searle’s refutation of the robot reply may indeed hold if we take human 
brains to be more complex and more extraordinary than the computers which we 
engineer ourselves, since that would suppose that the human brain is not simply a 
computer program. However, I argue that the human brain, while certainly 
complex, is not that special.  
I agree with Fodor’s argument that biology is not important for 
considering intentionality because a computer program may be able to possess 
intentional states and because human brains are not necessarily special in terms of 
their abilities (they may just be computer programs themselves) (Fodor, 1980). 
Therefore, a computer could in fact be capable of possessing propositional 
attitudes if it possessed “the right kind of causal relation[ship]” to the world 
around it, one that was capable of intentionality (Fodor, 1980, 431). I argue that 
perhaps we as humans are also “simply moving about as a result of [our] 
electrical wiring and [our] program” (Searle, 1980, 420). Despite the difference in 
the actual biological materials which make up a human brain and the 
manufactured materials which make up a nonhuman computer, the two systems 
may function very much in the same way. 
Ultimately, Searle fails to adequately defend his Chinese room thought 
experiment since he rejects this notion that human brains could actually be 
operating identically to the way computers operate. Fodor asserts that as long as 
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the computer or machine possesses a program for manipulating symbols and a 
way of interacting with the world, we can conclude that it has intentionality 
(representational properties of internal brain-states to the outside world) (Fodor, 
1980).  
Furthermore, humans also have physical bodies which allow us to interact 
with the world around us, helping us learn as we have more and more of these 
interactions. Therefore, human beings also satisfy Fodor’s conditions for 
intentionality. But it may not be our biological makeup which allows us to be 
deemed capable of thought and understanding, since it is not necessary that the 
program for manipulating symbols be biologically composed of a human brain or 
that the way of interacting with the world be composed of a human body. 
Therefore, a system need not be human to be capable of thought and 
understanding, and thus we may conceive of a machine which could be capable of 
such as well. 
If a machine were to be created which was ultimately able to fully pass the 
Turing test and which also possessed both of Fodor’s conditions for intentionality 
(again, there are that the system has 1. a program for manipulating symbols and 2. 
a way of interacting with the world) (Fodor, 1980), then I argue that we may 
conclude that this machine would function identically to the ways in which human 
beings function. Furthermore, this machine would not be merely simulating these 
same sorts of functions, but rather it would be genuinely functioning in the same 
way that humans do (and therefore, it could possess the possibility for being 
conscious, but I will address this conclusion further in Section 3). We could 
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conclude, then that this intelligent machine would possess propositional attitudes 
and intentionality. And therefore, it would ultimately be truly capable of thought 
and understanding. 
Ultimately, a machine which could both pass the Turing test and possess 
Fodor’s conditions for intentionality could be genuinely capable of thought and 
understanding since it would be both capable of intelligence and possess 
intentional (representational) properties. But this conclusion has important 
implications for considering whether or not machines which eventually (or even 
which hypothetically) reach this level of sophistication and complexity ought to 
be considered conscious beings in accordance with Global Workspace Theory. 
While we may conclude that these machines may be thinking and understanding 
and that they should be considered to be intelligent, this may not be a sufficient 
condition for their having consciousness, which is comprised of more than just a 
capacity for intelligence.  
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SECTION 3: 
HUMAN BRAINS AS COMPUTATIONAL 
 
 Now, I will expand upon the notion of the human brain possessing 
computational properties, which I briefly touched on in the previous section and 
which plays an important role in determining whether or not a machine could be 
capable of consciousness.  
The notion that our human minds themselves can be categorized as 
machines is not a new one. In her book entitled Mind as Machine: A History of 
Cognitive Science, Margaret Boden proposes that the idea that we may 
comprehend the mind as a kind of machine is a crucial and unique feature of 
cognitive science (Boden, 2006). For Boden, cognitive science is not restricted to 
traditional definitions of “cognition” (which focus on concepts such as knowledge 
and reasoning. Rather, she expands the classification of “cognition” to include 
notions like personality, emotion, communication, sociality, and action (Boden, 
2006).  
If we accept Boden’s notion of the mind as a machine, we may have a 
better way of understanding how other sorts of machines may function similarly 
to the human mind. While an exploration of the history cognitive science and a 
complete evaluation of Boden’s book is beyond the scope of this thesis, Boden’s 
suggestion lays the foundation for thinking about how a machine could think 
and/or be conscious. 
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 While Boden’s book references the human mind as a machine, Patricia and 
Paul Churchland categorize the human brain as “a kind of computer” in their 
1990 article entitled “Could a Machine Think?” (Churchland and Churchland, 
1990, 37). Although the human mind and the human brain are two distinct 
entities, they are both relevant to comparing human consciousness to machine 
consciousness. Churchland and Churchland’s article touches on a similar notion 
to Boden’s book, while further suggesting that systems which mimic the human 
brain may indeed generate a truly conscious machine. (Churchland and 
Churchland, 1990).  
Furthermore, Churchland and Churchland agree with John Searle’s 
rejection of the notion that the Turing test is a sufficient condition for conscious 
intelligence (Churchland and Churchland, 1990). They also note that, to some 
degree, their reasons for rejecting this notion are similar to those of Searle: both 
agree that the means by which the input-output function is realized is imperative. 
In their words, both Churchland and Churchland and Searle think that “it is 
important that the right sorts of things be going on inside the artificial machine” 
(Churchland and Churchland, 1990, 37).  
 However, while Searle’s argument stems from commonsensical instincts 
regarding whether or not semantic content is present, Churchland and Churchland 
ground their argument “on the specific behavioral failures of the classical SM 
machines and on the specific virtues of machines with a more brainlike 
architecture” and ultimately conclude that the brain “need not be the only physical 
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system capable of [making systematic use of computational advantages which the 
brain does]” (Churchland and Churchland, 1990, 37).  
Ultimately, I agree with Churchland and Churchland’s conclusion that a 
system which mimics a human brain (if we accept the human to be conscious) 
could potentially possess consciousness itself. As I have asserted before, we have 
no reason to believe that the human brain is special in its abilities. Thus, given 
these arguments, an AI which theoretically does not possess the same biological 
components as a human brain but which parallels the same sort of system could 
be a persuasive prospect for machine consciousness (again, with consciousness 
being defined via Global Workspace Theory). 
 Finally, I will conclude by introducing a final paper by Bernard Baars and 
Stan Franklin entitled “Consciousness is Computational: The LIDA Model of 
Global Workspace Theory.” I have chosen to end with this paper because it 
proposes a viable application of Global Workspace Theory to the possibility of 
machine consciousness. 
Baars and Franklin begin with the notion that any understanding of 
machine consciousness will be contingent on an understanding of human 
consciousness. For this purpose, they rely on Global Workspace Theory, given its 
consideration of the differing conscious and unconscious aspects of human 
cognition and its accounting for the correspondence of the vastly unconscious 
processing of the human brain and the fleeting capacity for conscious stream of 
thought (Baars and Franklin, 2009).  
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The LIDA model, principally based on Global Workspace Theory, is “a 
comprehensive, conceptual and computational model covering a large portion of 
human cognition” (Baars and Franklin, 2009, 3). However, the model, grounded 
in its cognitive cycle, can be applied to “every autonomous agent, be it human, 
animal, or artificial” (Baars and Franklin, 2009, 3)  
A further explanation of the LIDA model can be found in “Consciousness 
is Computational: The LIDA Model of Global Workspace Theory,” Baars and 
Franklin, 2009, Section 3. A figure of the LIDA cognitive cycle can be found 
below (Baars and Franklin, 2009, Figure 1):  
 
  
 
Baars and Franklin ultimately propose, as many others (including myself) 
have, that the human brain functions much in the same way that a computer does. 
Their claim, though, is evidenced by the LIDA cognitive cycle. They conclude 
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that “the conscious (and well as the non-conscious) aspects of human thinking, 
planning and perception and produced by adaptive, biological algorithms” (Baars 
and Franklin, 2009, 9). In other words, in humans, functions such as thinking, 
planning, and perception are merely complex collections of processes. These 
processes make up a sort of computational program itself. 
 Given this, Baars and Franklin also suggest that “machine consciousness 
may be produced by similar adaptive algorithms running on the machine” (Baars 
and Franklin, 2009, 9). That is to say, if a machine’s algorithms were to mimic 
those of a human brain, we would have reason to believe that a machine could be 
conscious as well. 
 Given Boden’s broader classification of “cognition,” Churchland and 
Churchland’s conclusion that a system parallel to that of the human mind could 
conceivably conscious, and Baars and Franklin’s notion that algorithms of human 
consciousness could be mimicked to produce machine consciousness, I conclude 
that human brains, minds, cognition, and overall consciousness are merely 
programs themselves. And thus, a machine could potentially mimic these systems 
in order to reach the same sort of consciousness as defined by Global Workspace 
Theory. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis pursued the following question: “could a machine be capable 
of consciousness?” In Section 1, I offered a presumed definition of consciousness 
for the purpose of my argument, utilizing Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace 
Theory. In Section 2, I discussed several considerations of machine intelligence 
and contemplated if they would be sufficient for categorizing a machine as 
conscious. Finally, in Section 3, I turned to the idea that the human brain may 
function as a computational system itself and concluded that given this idea, it is 
possible that non-human systems may achieve consciousness if they were to 
mimic human systems which give way to consciousness (at least insofar as these 
systems and consciousness itself are defined by Global Workspace Theory). 
Considering this, I conclude that the answer to my proposed question is yes, a 
machine could indeed be capable of consciousness. 
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